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PLAYING A “LABELING GAME”: 
CLASSIFYING EXPRESSION AS CONDUCT 
AS A MEANS OF CIRCUMVENTING FIRST 
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
Abstract: Courts have long recognized that the First Amendment protects both 
certain classes of speech and certain forms of conduct. Recently, in the context of 
state regulations prohibiting a particular form of counseling, courts have consid-
ered whether mental health counseling in the form of talk therapy falls within the 
category of conduct protected under the First Amendment. This Note argues that 
labeling an activity that takes place by means of speech as conduct is improper 
and leads to the perverse result of avoiding First Amendment analysis. In doing 
so, this Note examines the protection of speech and conduct under the First 
Amendment, explores opposing outcomes reached by several courts in consider-
ing the protection of counseling communications, and ultimately concludes that 
courts should not engage in “labeling games” that permit regulations of expres-
sion to be upheld without ever being subjected to First Amendment analysis. 
INTRODUCTION 
Use of mental health treatment by adults in the United States has become 
more widespread since such treatment originated after World War II.1 Recent 
studies show that millions of adults in the United States receive mental health 
treatment each year.2 One form of mental health treatment is psychotherapy or 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See The Prevalence and Treatment of Mental Health Today, HARV. HEALTH PUBLICATIONS 
(Dec. 5, 2005) http://www.health.harvard.edu/mind-and-mood/the-prevalence-and-treatment-of-
mental-illness-today, archived at http://perma.cc/HKU7-YP2P (stating that Americans have increased 
their use of mental health services due to “greater public awareness, more effective diagnosis, less 
stigma, more outreach programs, and greater availability of medications”). 
 2 Karen Pallarito, Poll: Mental Health Care Goes Mainstream, HEALTHDAY, http://consumer.
healthday.com/mental-health-information-25/depression-news-176/poll-mental-health-care-goes-
mainstream-518741.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9FNF-L6GB (last updated May 7, 2004) (provid-
ing that a poll showed that one in four adults in the United States had received mental health treatment in 
the two years preceding the poll); Results from the 2012 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Men-
tal Health Findings, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. (Dec. 2013), http://
archive.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k12MH_FindingsandDetTables/2K12MHF/NSDUHmhfr2012.htm, 
archived at http://perma.cc/TK9M-L67G (providing that, in 2012, “34.1 million persons aged 18 or older 
(14.5 percent of the population aged 18 or older) received mental health treatment or counseling during 
the past 12 months”); Use of Mental Health Services and Treatment Among Adults, NAT’L INST. OF 
MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/prevalence/use-of-mental-health-services-
and-treatment-among-adults.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/6HMJ-7QB9 (last visited Mar. 17, 2015) 
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“talk therapy,” which involves a patient discussing the problems, issues, and 
events in their life with a therapist.3 The goal of this process is for the patient 
to improve their quality of life by gaining insight and relief from the stressors 
that caused them to seek treatment.4 
The extent of what can be said in these talk therapy sessions, however, 
has recently become a subject of controversy.5 California and New Jersey both 
have statutes prohibiting the use of conversion therapy as applied to minors.6 
Conversion therapy involves a counselor using therapeutic techniques to 
change a patient’s sexual orientation.7 The legislation has been challenged in 
both states by plaintiffs who claim that their right of free expression under the 
First Amendment has been violated by this ban.8 One of the threshold issues 
courts must face in analyzing these claims is whether counseling communica-
tions should be classified as speech or conduct.9 After considering counseling 
communications, some courts have determined that it is speech, while other 
                                                                                                                           
(providing that in 2008, “13.4 percent of adults in the United States received treatment for a mental 
health problem”). 
 3 Kendra Cherry, What Is Talk Therapy?, PSYCHOLOGY.ABOUT.COM, http://psychology.about.
com/od/tindex/f/talk-therapy.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/P57Q-JGHE (last visited Mar. 17, 
2015); Psychotherapies, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/
psychotherapies/index.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/UBC3-ZHXP (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). 
Other forms of therapy include medication and brain stimulation therapies. Mental Health Infor-
mation, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/index.shtml, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/9DV4-PXDS (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). Medication alone may be provid-
ed to treat mental disorders or it may be provided in conjunction with psychotherapy. Mental Health 
Medications, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/mental-
health-medications/index.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/EPV4-F2SX (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). 
Brain stimulation therapies refer to treatments that involve “activating or touching the brain directly with 
electricity, magnets, or implants to treat depression and other disorders.” Brain Stimulation Therapies, 
NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/brain-stimulation-therapies/
brain-stimulation-therapies.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/7E5Y-WF55 (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). 
 4 Cherry, supra note 3.  
 5 See Pickup v. Brown (Pickup II), 728 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2013), abrogated and supersed-
ed by Pickup v. Brown (Pickup III), 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014); King v. Christie (King I), 981 F. 
Supp. 2d 296, 303 (D. N.J. 2013), aff’d, 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014); Pickup v. Brown (Pickup I), 42 
F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1349 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012), aff’d, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014); Welch v. 
Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d sub nom., Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 
1042 (9th Cir. 2013). 
6 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1 (West 2012 & Supp. 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-55 
(West 2004 & Supp. 2014).  
7 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1. Sexual orientation change efforts (“SOCE”) include 
techniques that are intended to change a person’s sexual orientation from homosexual to heterosexual. 
See Pickup I, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 1350–51. 
8 See Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1051; King I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 303.  
9 See Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1051; King I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 312; Pickup I, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 
1358; Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1112. 
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courts have concluded that it is conduct.10 Once a communication is deter-
mined to be conduct, regulation of that communication need not withstand 
First Amendment analysis.11  
These cases raise the issue of whether a regulation of speech can be up-
held without being subject to First Amendment analysis.12 Additionally, these 
cases consider the constitutionality of a state’s restriction on certain forms of 
counseling when it does not approve of the message being conveyed.13 The 
constitutional analysis requires a determination as to whether counseling con-
stitutes expression that should be afforded protection under the First Amend-
ment.14 In answering these questions, courts begin by classifying counseling as 
either speech or conduct.15 That classification determines whether First 
Amendment protection is afforded to counseling communications.16 
 This Note considers whether counseling communications should be classi-
fied as speech or conduct and argues that counseling communications should be 
considered speech, which means that any restriction of those communications 
should be subject to First Amendment analysis.17 Part I examines the signifi-
cance of freedom of speech, the speech versus conduct dichotomy, and prior cas-
es involving the classification of counseling communications as speech or con-
duct.18 Part II explores the classification of counseling communications by 
courts as speech or conduct and the standard of review applied to a regulation 
restricting communication during counseling sessions.19 Finally, Part III argues 
                                                                                                                           
10 Compare Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1051 (determining that counseling communications were con-
duct), and King I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 320 (holding that counseling communications amounted to con-
duct), with Pickup I, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 1358 (holding that counseling communications were conduct), 
and Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (finding that counseling communications were speech for purpos-
es of First Amendment analysis). 
11 See Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1057 (applying rational basis review after determining that counsel-
ing was conduct). 
12 See Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1214–15 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (observing that the ability to 
avoid First Amendment scrutiny by classifying “disfavored talk” as conduct is “what these cases are 
really about”). 
 13 See Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1051; King I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 303. 
 14 Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1051; King I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 312. 
 15 See Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1051. 
 16 See id.; King I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 312; cf. John T. Haggerty, Note, Begging and the Public 
Forum Doctrine in the First Amendment, 34 B.C. L. REV. 1121, 1125 (1993) (showing that courts 
determine whether an activity is considered speech as a threshold issue in the First Amendment con-
text). In this Note, “counseling” refers to treatment provided by a licensed mental health professional 
to a patient. Cf. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2903 (West 2012 & Supp. 2015) (providing that no person 
may engage in practicing psychology without a license). 
 17 See infra notes 185–243 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 21–101 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 102–184 and accompanying text. 
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that counseling communications is not conduct and, therefore, regulations re-
stricting counseling communication should be subject to strict scrutiny.20 
I. SPEECH VERSUS CONDUCT: TREATMENT UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
AND PRIOR CLASSIFICATIONS OF COUNSELING 
To determine the proper level of constitutional protection for counseling 
communications, it is necessary to understand the distinction between speech 
and conduct and how classification of an activity affects the level of scrutiny 
applied to regulations restricting that activity.21 Furthermore, it is helpful to 
reflect upon the importance of freedom of speech under the First Amend-
ment.22 This Part examines the distinction between speech and conduct, the 
implications of that distinction, and how courts have classified various activi-
ties as speech or conduct.23 First, Section A discusses the importance of free-
dom of speech under the First Amendment.24 Section B then explains the test 
that courts have established to determine whether an activity is speech or con-
duct, the standard used to determine whether a regulation is constitutional, and 
examples from relevant cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.25 Finally, 
Section C considers two cases decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit analyzing the regulation of speech in contexts similar to counsel-
ing.26 
A. First Amendment: Protecting Even Hated Speech 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right of free 
expression by providing that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech.”27 Under the First Amendment, the government is general-
ly unable to restrict certain classes of speech in any way.28 When the govern-
                                                                                                                           
 20 See infra notes 185–243 and accompanying text. 
 21 See Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1125; see also Michael A. Henderson, Comment, Today’s 
Symbolic Speech Dilemma: Flag Desecration and the Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 41 S.D. 
L. REV. 533, 543–47 (1996) (describing symbolic conduct and the level of scrutiny applied by courts 
depending on whether a regulation is content-based or content-neutral). 
 22 See Henderson, supra note 21, at 535 (discussing the significance of the right to free speech 
under the First Amendment). 
 23 See infra notes 27–101 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 27–41 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 42–90 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 91–101 and accompanying text. 
 27 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 28 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 511 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (observing that 
“[w]here the First Amendment applies, it is a denial of all governmental power in our Federal sys-
tem”); Brent Hunter Allen, Note, The First Amendment and Homosexual Expression: The Need for an 
Expanded Interpretation, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1073, 1082 (1994) (recognizing that full protection is 
granted to political speech and certain kinds of non-political speech, including art and literature). 
2015] Classifying Counseling Communications as Speech Under the First Amendment 771 
ment attempts to restrict protected classes of speech, courts apply a particular 
level of scrutiny in their judicial review of the regulation’s constitutionality.29 
Courts determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply based on the class 
of speech that the government is attempting to restrict and the type of regula-
tion.30 
Freedom of speech has been recognized as a fundamental aspect of indi-
vidual liberty and our democratic system of government.31 In reflecting on this 
right, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”32 The three leading justifications for affording high levels of 
protection to speech include the marketplace of ideas theory,33 the self-
governance theory,34 and the self-fulfillment theory.35 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (describing various levels of scruti-
ny that may be applied in examining a restriction on speech); see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech 
and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About 
You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1095 (2000) (recognizing that certain classes of speech may be restricted 
only by laws that pass strict scrutiny); Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1125–26 (describing how courts 
determine the level of scrutiny to apply when analyzing a restriction on speech). 
 30 See Turner, 512 U.S. at 642 (providing that the level of scrutiny applied to a restriction on 
speech turns on certain factors, such as whether the restriction is content-neutral or content-based); 
Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1125–26 (providing that whether a regulation of speech is content-neutral 
or content-based determines the level of scrutiny that will be applied in examining the regulation); 
infra notes 76–90 and accompanying text (describing the various levels of scrutiny applied by courts 
and how courts determine which level of scrutiny should be applied). 
 31 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that the 
protection of free speech is “essential to the very existence of a democracy”); Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (describing the freedom of speech as “among the fundamental personal rights 
and liberties which are secured to all persons”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (explaining that “those who won our independence . . . believed that free-
dom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth” and this freedom “should be a fundamental principle of the American gov-
ernment”); see also Henderson, supra note 21, at 535 (stating that the “concept of free speech has long 
been recognized as a cornerstone of individual liberty”). 
 32 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
 33 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, REGULATION OF 
MASS MEDIA, FREEDOM OF RELIGION 14 (1999). The marketplace theory opposes speech regulation 
because it holds that the best test of an idea is its ability to prevail in a competitive market. See id. The 
marketplace metaphor is based on an “essentially optimistic vision of human history, a faith that over 
the long run, good will conquer evil.” See id. Under this theory, free speech allows truth to persist as 
long as necessary to overcome falsehoods. See id.; see also Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1130 (describ-
ing the marketplace of ideas theory as one of the values underlying the First Amendment). 
 34 See SMOLLA, supra note 33, at 14–15. The self-governance theory holds that free speech is an 
essential instrument of self-governance in a democratic society. See id. at 14. This theory recognizes 
several ways in which free speech supports self-governance. Id. For example, it enables public partic-
ipation in the decision-making process that shapes society. See id. It also furthers the pursuit of politi-
cal truth and helps ensure that the will of the majority is implemented. See id. Finally, it prevents 
government from acting beyond the constraints of its power and encourages stability. See id. 
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. recognized that the immense value of 
the First Amendment derives from its protection of not only “free thought for 
those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.”36 The free-
dom to discuss ideas that are hated serves an important role as a test for socie-
ty’s biases and preconceptions.37 Moreover, free exchange allows society to 
better prepare to deal with conflicts that threaten to undermine stability.38 
Oral speech and the printed word are generally protected under the First 
Amendment.39 Nevertheless, the First Amendment does not provide absolute 
protection to speak free from restriction depending on the content of speech 
and the location where speech occurs.40 Courts have identified certain kinds of 
speech as unprotected, including fighting words, obscenity, and child pornog-
raphy.41 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See id. at 15. The self-fulfillment theory views free speech as an end in itself. See id. According 
to this theory, free speech requires protection not because it benefits the common good, but rather 
because it is “intertwined with human autonomy and dignity.” See id. The state, therefore, should not 
be able to regulate an individual’s speech because it is connected to the ability to “think, imagine, and 
create,” which is a revered aspect of individuality. See id. 
 36 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In 2010, Jus-
tice Samuel Alito endorsed this statement by noting that the “proudest boast of our free speech juris-
prudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’” Christian Legal Soc’y 
Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 706 (2010) (Alito, 
J., dissenting). 
 37 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 584 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Full and free discussion even of ideas 
we hate encourages the testing of our own prejudices and preconceptions.”); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, 
to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced 
silence.”); Abrams v. United States 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (“[T]he ultimate good desired is better 
reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes 
safely can be carried out.”). 
 38 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 584 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Full and free discussion keeps a society 
from becoming stagnant and unprepared for the stresses and strains that work to tear all civilizations 
apart.”); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[O]rder cannot be secured merely 
through fear of punishment for its infraction . . . that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds 
hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss 
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies . . . .”). 
 39 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 585 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that “free speech is the rule, not 
the exception”); DAVID L. HUDSON JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH 48 (2012) 
(noting that both oral and written speech is generally protected under the First Amendment). 
 40 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971) (providing that the First Amendment has 
“never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or wherever he 
pleases or to use any form of address in any circumstances that he chooses”). 
 41 See Henderson, supra note 21, at 543. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that obscene speech, 
“sexually explicit material that violates fundamental notions of decency,” was not protected under the 
First Amendment. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288 (2008). Likewise, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has recognized that child pornography, in the form of sexually explicit images featuring chil-
dren, is a category of prohibited speech. Id. Otherwise, however, images of sexual acts are generally a 
form of communication and, thus, speech protected by the First Amendment. See Ashcroft v. Free 
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B. Protecting Expression: Distinguishing Activities Warranting Protection 
and Subjecting Attempted Regulation  
to More Demanding Scrutiny 
Modern courts have recognized that the protection afforded by the First 
Amendment is not limited to the “spoken or written word.”42 Certain kinds of 
conduct are also protected under the First Amendment.43 Subsection 1 discuss-
es how courts distinguish between conduct that receives protection under the 
First Amendment and conduct that is not protected.44 Subsection 2 then ex-
plores the different levels of scrutiny applied to each.45  
1. Distinguishing Protected Conduct 
The U.S. Supreme Court has established a standard for determining when 
conduct is sufficiently expressive and should be protected.46 Conduct receives 
First Amendment protection when it is intended to convey a message and that 
message is likely to be understood.47 Communication often occurs in a manner 
other than oral speech or the printed word.48 Many types of expression involve 
                                                                                                                           
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002) (recognizing that child pornography as a class of unprotected 
speech does not include virtual child pornography which is not produced with real children); Andrew 
Koppelman, Free Speech and Pornography: A Response to James Weinstein, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 899, 908–09 (2007) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has deemed child pornogra-
phy to be “constitutionally distinct” from virtual images of child pornography). Fighting words are 
words that cause injury immediately after being spoken and are likely to cause a swift breach of peace. 
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
 42 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (providing that the Court has “long recognized that its protection 
does not end at the spoken or written word,” but also includes certain kinds of conduct); Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (holding that where conduct is sufficiently expressive, it is 
protected under the First Amendment). 
 43 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 409. The Court determined that protected conduct must contain suffi-
cient communicative elements to implicate the First Amendment. See id.; see also City of Erie v. 
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (holding that nude dancing was expressive conduct protected 
under the First Amendment); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990) (recognizing flag 
burning as expressive conduct that merits First Amendment protection). 
44 See infra notes 46–75 and accompanying text. 
45 See infra notes 76–90 and accompanying text. 
 46 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11(establishing the test for when conduct is considered sufficiently 
expressive to deserve First Amendment protection); see infra notes 51–56 and accompanying text 
(describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s test for determining when conduct is sufficiently expressive to 
warrant First Amendment protection). 
 47 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11 (establishing the test for whether a form of conduct is protected 
under the First Amendment); see Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1124 (explaining that for conduct to be 
protected, the speaker must have intended the conduct to convey a certain message and there must be 
a great likelihood that the message would be understood); Sally A. Specht, Comment, 40 WASH. U. J. 
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 173, 179 (1991) (same). 
 48 See Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 289 (explaining that nude dancing was expressive conduct, alt-
hough it was in the outer limits of First Amendment protection); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 
U.S. 560, 565–66 (1991) (holding that nude dancing was expressive conduct); Eichman, 496 U.S. at 
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some form of conduct, such as participating in a protest.49 Consequently, 
courts have struggled to classify certain forms of expression as either purely 
speech or purely conduct.50 
The Supreme Court has held that certain kinds of conduct are sufficiently 
communicative to be considered expressive and receive First Amendment pro-
tections.51 The Court employs a two-prong test to determine whether conduct 
is sufficiently communicative to warrant protection.52 The first prong requires 
that the party intended to communicate a particularized message.53 The second 
prong requires a determination of whether the message would be reasonably 
understood by those who receive it.54 If an act satisfies both prongs, it qualifies 
as expressive conduct.55 Courts have applied this test in many different cases, 
                                                                                                                           
315 (recognizing flag burning as expressive conduct); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405–06 (determining that 
the burning of an American flag as part of a political demonstration was sufficiently expressive to 
warrant First Amendment protection); see also Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1123–24 (providing that 
the First Amendment reflects the desire to protect ideas and not merely words).  
 49 See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balanc-
ing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1494 (1975) (“To some extent expression 
and action are always mingled . . . .”). Peaceful picketing has also been determined to be expressive 
conduct that is protected under the First Amendment. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980). 
Additionally, flying an American flag with a peace symbol attached was sufficiently expressive to 
warrant First Amendment protection. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11. 
 50 See Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1124 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has had difficulty 
distinguishing protected expression from ordinary conduct). 
 51 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 409 (providing that even when a message is not conveyed via written 
or spoken words, it may be protected under the First Amendment if it is “sufficiently imbued with 
elements of communication”); Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1123 (providing that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has “not limited the First Amendment to the spoken or written word, but has extended the 
Amendment's sweep to include conduct that conveys a message”). 
 52 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11 (establishing a two-part test requiring that the speaker intended to 
convey a message and that there was a significant likelihood that the recipients of the message would 
understand it); see Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1124 (providing that the two-prong test requires that 
the speaker must have intended the conduct to convey a certain message and there must be a great 
likelihood that the message would be understood); Specht, supra note 47, at 179 (explaining that, in 
order for conduct to merit protection, the speaker must intend to convey a message and that message 
must be likely to be understood). 
 53 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11 (holding that the speaker must have intended to convey a message 
for the conduct to be protected under the First Amendment); Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1124 (provid-
ing that the first prong of the test laid out in Spence v. Washington requires that the speaker intended 
to convey a message). 
 54 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11 (requiring a great likelihood “that the message would be under-
stood by those who viewed it” for conduct to be protected under the First Amendment); Haggerty, 
supra note 16, at 1124 (providing that the “Court required a strong likelihood that the audience could 
discern the intended message” for conduct to be protected). 
 55 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11 (requiring both that the speaker intended to convey a message and 
that there was a significant likelihood that the recipients of the message would understand it for con-
duct to be protected under the First Amendment); Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1124 (stating that both 
prongs of the test set out in Spence must be satisfied before conduct receives First Amendment protec-
tion). 
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but a universal rule has proved elusive because the unique attributes of each 
activity must be considered.56 
Due to the fact driven nature of determining whether an activity is speech 
or conduct, it is helpful to consider the Supreme Court’s classification of those 
activities it has reviewed.57 The Court has expressly rejected the “view that an 
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the 
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”58 
The Court has found a variety of activities to be sufficiently expressive to 
warrant First Amendment protection.59 For example, displaying an American 
flag with a peace symbol attached was a “pointed expression” as opposed to 
“mindless nihilism,” and thus was a protected form of expression.60 Addition-
ally, the Court determined that nude dancing61 and peaceful picketing consti-
tuted expressive conduct.62 Conversely, the Court has determined that other 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See Specht, supra note 47, at 174 (stating that it “remains unclear what type of conduct is suffi-
ciently expressive to warrant [F]irst [A]mendment protection”). 
 57 See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26 (2010) (holding that the provi-
sion of material support by means of speech could not be considered solely conduct); Pap’s A.M., 529 
U.S. at 289 (explaining that nude dancing was expressive conduct, although it was in the outer limits 
of First Amendment protection); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (holding that physi-
cal assault was not expressive conduct and not protected under the First Amendment); Eichman, 496 
U.S. at 315 (recognizing that the government’s concession that flag burning was expressive conduct 
was necessary); Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705 (1986) (concluding that prostitution 
manifested no expressive element); Carey, 447 U.S. at 460 (holding that peaceful picketing was ex-
pressive conduct that was protected under the First Amendment); Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11 (holding 
that displaying an American flag with a peace symbol attached to it is sufficiently expressive to be 
protected under the First Amendment). 
 58 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 59 See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405–06 (concluding that the burning of an American flag was 
protected under the First Amendment); Carey, 447 U.S. at 460 (determining that peaceful picketing 
was protected under the First Amendment); Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11 (holding that flying an Amer-
ican flag with a peace symbol attached was constitutionally protected expressive conduct). 
 60 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11; see also Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405–06 (noting that state’s conces-
sion that the burning of an American flag as part of a demonstration was expressive conduct was 
“prudent”). 
 61 Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 289 (holding that nude dancing was a form of protected expression, 
although it was nearing the boundaries of protected expression). 
 62 Carey, 447 U.S. at 460 (concluding that there was “no doubt” that picketing by members of a 
civil rights organization on a public sidewalk in a residential neighborhood constituted expressive 
conduct). 
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activities, including prostitution63 and physical assault, do not constitute ex-
pressive conduct.64 
When the Court has found that an activity was sufficiently expressive to 
warrant protection, it has considered the activity’s nature, context, and set-
ting.65 For example, the Court noted that activities involving flags and peaceful 
picketing had historically been recognized as expressive.66 The Court also con-
sidered whether an activity occurred in the context of responding to a political 
event or issue, for instance in response to an American military action.67 Fur-
thermore, the Court noted the environment where the activity occurred, and 
whether those who were exposed to the activity would understand what was 
meant by it.68 By comparison, in those cases where the Court determined that 
an activity was not sufficiently expressive to warrant protection, the Court re-
lied upon the determination that there was not any expressive element of the 
activity at issue.69 Based on the Court’s reasoning, the context and environ-
ment where an activity occurs can provide additional support for a determina-
tion that an activity was expressive, but an activity fails to be expressive based 
only on the lack of an expressive element and not necessarily for the particular 
context or environment.70 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See Arcara, 478 U.S. at 705 (holding that prostitution was not expressive conduct because such 
sexual activity did not have even “the semblance of expressive activity”). The Court distinguished 
prostitution from protected speech, such as the burning of a draft card, based on the fact that the burn-
ing of the card was meant to “carry a message,” whereas the sexual activity “manifest[ed] absolutely 
no element of protected expression.” See id. 
 64 See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484 (concluding that physical assault was “not by any stretch of the 
imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment”). 
 65 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 409–10. The communicative nature of flags had been recognized by 
the Court for decades. See id. at 410. The Court also looked to context to give meaning to the use of 
the flag. See id. The displaying of the flag had been “triggered by the Cambodian incursion and the 
Kent State tragedy,” both important public issues. Id. The Court also noted that the majority of stu-
dents who saw the flag would have understood what was meant by it. Id.; see Johnson, 491 U.S. at 
406 (considering that the American flag was burned in the context of a political demonstration); Car-
ey, 447 U.S. at 460 (recognizing that peaceful picketing had historically been treated as protected 
under the First Amendment). 
 66 Carey, 447 U.S. at 460 (holding that peaceful picketing was expressive conduct protected un-
der the First Amendment); Spence, 418 U.S. at 410 (recognizing the burning of an American flag as 
expressive conduct). 
 67 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410. 
 68 See id. (noting that “it would have been difficult for the great majority of citizens to miss the 
drift” of the message); see also Kime v. United States, 459 U.S. 949, 950 (1982) (recognizing that it 
was “clear from the context” that by burning an American flag the petitioners were “making a state-
ment of political protest” and that most citizens who observed the act would understand that message). 
 69 See Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 at 484; Arcara, 478 U.S. 697 at 705. 
 70 See, e.g., Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 at 484 (determining that physical assault was not protected 
expression without looking to the environment or context in which the conduct took place); Arcara, 
478 U.S. at 705 (concluding that prostitution was not protected expression without examining the 
context because the activity contained “absolutely no element of protected expression”); Carey, 447 
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More recently, in 2010, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the U.S. 
Supreme Court considered an activity closer in nature to counseling than the 
previous examples.71 The Court examined whether the provision of “material 
support” to particular groups in the form of speech was conduct or speech.72 
The plaintiffs claimed that their right to free expression had been violated be-
cause they were not able to provide legal training and advocacy advice to 
groups that had been classified as foreign terrorist organizations by the Secre-
tary of State.73 The Court reasoned that the regulation was content-based be-
cause it regulated the plaintiffs’ speech in communications with certain groups 
based on what they said.74 Thus, the Court concluded that the law applied to 
the activity of providing support because the speech involved communicated a 
certain message and, therefore, a standard more demanding than intermediate 
scrutiny should be applied.75 
2. Applying First Amendment Scrutiny 
After reaching a conclusion as to whether an activity is protected under 
the First Amendment, courts must determine the appropriate level of scrutiny 
for analyzing the constitutionality of that activity’s regulation.76 The level of 
First Amendment protection differs depending on whether an activity is con-
                                                                                                                           
U.S. at 460 (considering the historical treatment of peaceful picketing as part of the context in reach-
ing the determination that the conduct was protected); Spence, 418 U.S. at 410 (considering both the 
environment where the conduct took place and the expressive nature of flags in reaching determina-
tion that attaching a peace symbol to the flag was expressive conduct). 
 71 See 561 U.S. at 26.  
 72 Id. The term “material support” is defined in the statute at issue as “any property, tangible or 
intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial 
services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identifica-
tion, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel . . . and 
transportation, except medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2012). 
 73 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 10–11. The Government argued that the statute only 
regulated conduct because it prohibited “material support,” which occurs in forms other than speech, 
and only “incidentally burdened” expression. Id. at 26. The Court recognized that the plaintiffs were 
able to speak freely about various groups and advocate for them independently, but that did not mean 
that the plaintiffs speech had not been impacted. See id. 
 74 Id. at 26–28. The Court determined that the government was “wrong that the only thing actual-
ly at issue . . . [was] conduct” and, thus, incorrect in arguing that intermediate scrutiny was the appro-
priate standard of review. Id. at 26. 
 75 Id. at 27–28. The Court rejected the government’s argument that, because the statute generally 
regulated conduct rather than speech, intermediate scrutiny should apply. Id. 
 76 See Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1231 (determining that rational basis review applied after conclud-
ing that the regulation in question had only an incidental effect on speech); King I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 
312 (explaining that courts must first determine whether an activity consists of protected speech and 
then decide the level of scrutiny that should apply when examining a restriction on that activi-
ty); Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1125 (providing that “[o]nce an activity is found to be protectable 
speech, a court must determine the level of scrutiny to apply to restrictions on that activity”). 
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sidered speech or conduct.77 If an activity is considered conduct, courts apply 
rational basis review because the regulation does not impact protected expres-
sion.78 Under rational basis review, a statute will be upheld if the state meets 
its burden of identifying a legitimate state interest that the state legislature 
could have rationally concluded was advanced by the statute at issue.79 This is 
a highly deferential standard; therefore, it is uncommon for courts to declare a 
regulation unconstitutional under rational basis review.80 
In contrast, if a court classifies an activity as speech and the regulation of 
that activity restricts the expression involved in the activity, then the court 
takes a two-track approach in reviewing the constitutionality of the regulation 
based on whether restrictions are content-based or content-neutral.81 Content-
based restrictions are targeted to prohibit speech, whereas content-neutral re-
strictions are aimed at another activity and merely affect speech incidentally.82 
The primary test for determining whether a regulation is content-neutral or 
content-based is by looking at whether certain kinds of speech have been pro-
hibited as a result of the government’s disagreement with the message con-
veyed.83  
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 4 (recognizing that a restriction on conduct that 
communicates a message is subject to higher scrutiny than conduct that does not communicate a mes-
sage); Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1225, 1231 (noting that heightened scrutiny applies to speech and con-
duct that is protected under the First Amendment, although rational basis review applies to unprotect-
ed conduct); King I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (providing that rational basis review is applied if protected 
speech is not burdened and a higher level of scrutiny is applied if speech is burdened). 
 78 See King I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (providing that rational basis review is applied “if the statute 
does not implicate or burden constitutionally protected speech or expression in any matter”). 
 79 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985) (applying 
rational basis review in the context of an equal protection challenge); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 
427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); see also Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 66 F.3d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 80 See Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne 
Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L. J. 591, 606 (2000). In practice, a judge applying the standard essentially 
asks whether, given the information available, the legislature could have conceivably believed that the 
statute “might, even if only in the most remote or tenuous way, further or promote a legitimate actual 
or hypothetical goal.” Id. As expected, the statute is typically upheld. Id. The standard is so lenient 
that rational basis review has been described as amounting to a “virtual rubber stamp” because it is 
nearly impossible to fail the test. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitu-
tion, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 79 (1997) (stating that “judicial scrutiny under rational basis review is 
typically so deferential as to amount to a virtual rubber stamp”).  
 81 See Turner, 512 U.S. at 642; see also Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1125; Anthony M. Masero, 
Note, I Came, ITAR, I Conquered: The International Traffic in Arms Regulation, 3D-Printed Fire-
arms, and the First Amendment, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1291, 1298–1302 (2014) (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of content-based versus content-neutral restrictions). 
 82 See Turner, 512 U.S. at 642; see also Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1125. 
 83 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). The purpose of the government in 
enacting the restriction is the key factor in determining whether a regulation is content-based or con-
tent-neutral. Id. If the government purpose is not related to the content of the expression, then the 
regulation is content-neutral. Id. 
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Courts apply strict scrutiny to content-based restrictions.84 Under strict 
scrutiny, courts ask whether the restriction serves a “compelling state interest” 
and is “narrowly tailored” to achieve that purpose.85 Strict scrutiny is a more 
demanding standard than rational basis review; thus, there is a greater proba-
bility of a regulation being struck down under this standard.86 
Intermediate scrutiny applies to content-neutral restrictions that inci-
dentally affect speech.87 Under intermediate scrutiny, a regulation is upheld if 
the court concludes that the state interest in regulating the non-speech element 
is sufficiently compelling to justify an incidental limitation of free expres-
sion.88 Under intermediate scrutiny, a “sufficiently important governmental 
interest” has the following characteristics: it “furthers an important or substan-
tial government interest;” it is “unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion;” and restricts alleged First Amendment freedoms no more than is neces-
sary to further the government interest.89 Under intermediate scrutiny, a re-
striction on speech is as likely to be upheld as it is to be struck down.90  
                                                                                                                           
 84 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 804 (2000) (determining that when a 
restriction “is content based, it can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny”); Haggerty, supra note 16, 
at 1126 (providing that strict scrutiny is applied to content-based regulations); Masero, supra note 81, 
at 1299 (“Content-based restrictions are generally subject to strict scrutiny because they present the 
greatest risk of government actively suppressing ideas”). 
 85 Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1126. A compelling state interest is one of greater significance than 
the “important” state interest required in intermediate scrutiny or the “legitimate” state interest re-
quired in rational basis review. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
1267, 1273 (2007). Compelling state interests are “not only extremely weighty, possibly urgent, but 
also rare—much rarer than merely legitimate interests and rarer too than important interests.” Id. The 
“narrowly tailored” element requires “an especially tight connection between challenged legislative 
means and the ends they . . . promote.” Id. at 1274. “Narrow tailoring” is a stricter requirement than 
the rational relationship required under rational basis review and the substantial relationship required 
under intermediate scrutiny. Id. 
 86 See Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyen v. INS and the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to Gen-
der Classifications: Theory, Practice, and Reality, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 190–91 (2003). 
 87 Turner, 512 U.S. at 642 (providing that “regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech 
are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny”); O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (establishing that a con-
tent-neutral restriction on speech may be upheld if it is “within the constitutional power of the Gov-
ernment; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest”); see also 
Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1127 (recognizing that a content-neutral restriction on speech “receives a 
lower level of scrutiny and must only be narrowly tailored to serve a significant state interest”). 
 88 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (providing that a “sufficiently important governmental interest in 
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms”); 
see also Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1126. 
 89 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (providing an outline of the intermediate scrutiny standard). 
90 See Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 318 (1998) (“The most striking feature of intermediate scrutiny is that, 
unlike strict scrutiny or rationality review, the tier of scrutiny that the Court decides to apply does not 
predetermine the outcome of the case; with intermediate scrutiny, sometimes the state wins, and some-
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C. Psychoanalysis and Physician Communications Recognized as  
Protected by the Ninth Circuit 
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit has had the opportunity 
to examine speech in the context of psychoanalysis as well as communication 
between a physician and patient in earlier cases.91 In 2000, in National Ass’n 
for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Board of Psychology 
(NAAP), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the claim 
that the California mental health licensing laws restricted psychoanalysts’ 
rights under the First Amendment.92 The court concluded that “special First 
Amendment protection” was not owed to psychoanalysts because it determined 
that the treatment of emotional suffering and depression rather than speech was 
the most significant aspect of psychoanalysis.93 Nevertheless, the court 
acknowledged that “communication that occurs during psychoanalysis” is con-
stitutionally protected.94 Moreover, the court also found California’s licensing 
rules to be content-neutral because they did not dictate the parameters of per-
mitted speech between the patient and psychologist during treatment and, thus, 
strict scrutiny was not triggered.95 
In contrast, in 2002, in Conant v. Walters, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit invalidated a federal policy that sought to punish physicians 
for communicating with their patients about the use of medical marijuana be-
                                                                                                                           
times it loses.”); see also Melissa Reynolds, Note, How Old Is Too Old?: The Need for Federal Regu-
lation Imposing a Maximum Age Limit on Women Seeking Infertility Treatment, 7 IND. HEALTH L. 
REV. 277, 301 (2010) (stating that it is difficult to “predict the outcome if intermediate scrutiny review 
is applied” since it depends on the balancing of private and governmental interests).  
 91 See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2002); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of 
Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology (NAAP), 228 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 92 228 F.3d at 1046. Under the California Business and Professions Code, a “psychologist” is 
defined as an individual who represents himself or herself “to the public by any title or description,” 
including “psychoanalysis” and “psychoanalyst.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2902(c) (West 2012 & 
Supp. 2015). Furthermore, a person must have a license to practice psychology, which is defined as 
the rendering of any psychological service to the public for a fee. Id. § 2903. Section 2529 provides 
that graduates of four California psychoanalytic institutes or equivalent institutes “may engage in 
psychoanalysis as adjunct to teaching, training, or research and hold themselves out to the public as 
psychoanalysts,” but may not spend more than one third of his professional time providing psychoana-
lytic services for a fee. Id.§ 2529. 
 93 NAAP, 228 F.3d at 1054. The plaintiffs argued that because psychoanalysis was the “talking 
cure,” it consisted of “pure speech” and was due special protection under the First Amendment. Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 1055. “Whether the government has adopted [the] regulation . . . because of [agreement 
or] disagreement with the message it conveys” was the test the court laid out to determine whether the 
regulation was content-neutral or content-based. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also 
noted that the regulation did not prevent the practice of psychoanalytical methods if no fee was 
charged. Id. 
2015] Classifying Counseling Communications as Speech Under the First Amendment 781 
cause it impacted protected expression.96 The court noted that in NAAP, it had 
previously recognized that communication in the context of psychoanalysis 
treatment is entitled to protection under the First Amendment.97 It also recog-
nized that the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that a physician’s communi-
cation with his patient was afforded protection under the First Amendment be-
cause of the importance of the relationship.98 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the government’s policy was content-based because only doc-
tor-patient communication about a particular issue, the medical use of marijua-
na, triggered the policy.99 The court distinguished NAAP based on the fact that 
the regulation in that case was content-neutral as it “did not attempt to ‘dictate 
the content of what is said in therapy’ and did not prevent licensed therapists 
from utilizing particular ‘psycho-analytical methods.’”100 In contrast, the fed-
eral policy was content-based because it was only triggered when marijuana 
use was discussed, which is problematic in the context of the First Amend-
ment.101 
II. FAILURE TO REACH CONSENSUS: COURTS CANNOT AGREE ON THE 
APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION OF COUNSELING COMMUNICATIONS  
Counseling commonly occurs by means of the spoken word and, there-
fore, it seems that these communications should qualify for some level of pro-
tection under the First Amendment.102 Courts have differed, however, as to 
whether a restriction on certain counseling communications impacts speech.103 
The issue is a novel one, and few courts have addressed whether such commu-
nications are entitled to constitutional protection.104 
                                                                                                                           
 96 309 F.3d at 632. The challenged policy provided for the investigation of physicians who pro-
fessionally recommended the use of medical marijuana and the potential loss of their license for pre-
scribing controlled substances. Id. 
 97 Id. at 637. 
 98 Id. at 636 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality 
opinion)) (noting that a physician has the right not to speak under the First Amendment). 
 99 Id. at 637. 
 100 Id. (citation omitted). 
 101 Id. “When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers 
on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.” Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
 102 See Paul Sherman & Robert McNamara, Op-Ed., Protecting the Speech We Hate, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 10, 2013, at A31 (arguing that it is a “no-brainer” that counseling communications should be 
protected as free speech). 
 103 See Pickup v. Brown (Pickup I), 42 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1358 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012), aff’d, 
740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014); Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d 
sub nom., Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 104 See King v. Christie (King I), 981 F. Supp. 2d 296, 312 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d, 767 F.3d 216 (3d 
Cir. 2014).  
782 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:767 
This Part examines the approaches taken by courts in analyzing the con-
stitutionality of regulations prohibiting certain counseling communications and 
more specifically, whether counseling should be considered speech or con-
duct.105 Section A discusses the reasoning employed by two district courts in 
coming to opposing conclusions as to whether counseling communications 
amounted to speech or conduct.106 Section B then examines how the Ninth 
Circuit came to the holding that counseling should be considered conduct and 
how the Third Circuit instead determined that counseling communications 
should be classified as speech.107 Finally, Section C discusses the dissenting 
opinion from the Ninth Circuit’s denial of an en banc hearing of the same case 
and how it adds to the classification analysis.108 
A. Clashing Conclusions: District Courts Reaching Opposing Results in 
Classifying Counseling Communications  
Recently, several courts have considered whether counseling communica-
tions should be protected under the First Amendment.109 In California, two 
groups of plaintiffs brought lawsuits seeking to enjoin enforcement of sec-
tion 865 of the California Business and Professions Code because it violated 
their right of free speech.110 Section 865 prohibits state-licensed mental health 
providers from engaging in sexual orientation change efforts (“SOCE”) with 
patients younger than eighteen years of age.111 Two California district courts 
considered the constitutionality of the statute, and each court applied different 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See infra notes 109–184 and accompanying text. 
 106 See infra notes 109–143 and accompanying text. 
 107 See infra notes 144–168 and accompanying text. 
 108 See infra notes 169–184 and accompanying text. 
 109 See Pickup v. Brown (Pickup II), 728 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2013), abrogated and super-
seded by Pickup v. Brown (Pickup III), 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014); King I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 303; 
Pickup I, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 1356; Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1112; see also Wollschlaeger v. Governor 
of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1211, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that the law in question was a valid regu-
lation of professional conduct despite plaintiffs’ allegation that their right to engage in firearms coun-
seling had been restricted in violation of the First Amendment). 
 110 Pickup I, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 1349; Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1105. 
 111 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1 (West 2012 & Supp. 2015); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 45:1-55 (West 2004 & Supp. 2014) (defining SOCE as “the practice of seeking to change a person’s 
sexual orientation, including, but not limited to, efforts to change behaviors, gender identity, or gender 
expressions, or to reduce or eliminate sexual or romantic attractions or feelings toward a person of the 
same gender”). SOCE therapy includes techniques that are intended to change a person’s sexual orien-
tation from homosexual to heterosexual. See Pickup I, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 1350–51. These techniques 
may include psychoanalysis, behavioral therapy, religious counseling, and spiritual counseling. Id. 
Additionally, treatments may be aversive or nonaversive. Id. at 1351. Aversive techniques, which are 
not recommended based on current research and professional ethical standards, include inducing nau-
sea, shame aversion, orgasmic reconditioning, and satiation therapy. Id. Nonaversive therapies focus 
on altering “thought patterns by reframing desires, redirecting thoughts, or using hypnosis.” Id. 
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reasoning and reached a different result as to whether the activity should be 
treated as protected speech or unprotected conduct.112 Although the two cases 
were ultimately combined in a case heard by the Ninth Circuit,113 the reasoning 
demonstrates the difficulty involved in determining whether an activity that 
occurs by means of oral communication should be classified as speech or con-
duct.114 Subsection 1 describes Welch v. Brown, the 2012 case where the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of California concluded that the regula-
tion was content-based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.115 Subsection 2 
then discusses Pickup v. Brown (Pickup I), another 2012 case, where the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of California determined that the statute 
regulated conduct and therefore only needed to withstand rational basis re-
view.116 
1. Section 865 is a Content-Based Restriction on Speech That Demands 
Strict Scrutiny 
In Welch, the district court found that section 865 was a content-based re-
striction on speech that required strict scrutiny.117 The court relied on the 2000 
decision Conant v. Walters from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, which determined that communication occurring during psychoanalysis 
was protected under the First Amendment.118 The court treated Conant as con-
clusive in determining that the speech at issue was protected,119 and reasoned 
that the despite the fact that the statute regulated professional conduct, height-
ened scrutiny should apply if the regulation is content-based.120 Furthermore, 
the court noted that in 2000, in National Ass’n for the Advancement of Psycho-
analysis v. California Board of Psychology (NAAP), the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit recognized that content-based professional regulations 
were subject to strict scrutiny.121 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See Pickup I, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 1356, 1358; Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1105, 1112. 
 113 Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1048. 
 114 See Pickup I, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 1358; Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1112. 
 115 See infra notes 117–131 and accompanying text.  
 116 See infra notes 132–143 and accompanying text.  
 117 See 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1105, 1117. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the statute 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 1106–07. Section 1983 grants a private right of action under federal 
law for individuals who have been deprived of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws. 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 118 Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1109; see Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“[C]ommunication that occurs during psychoanalysis is entitled to First Amendment protection.”). 
 119 See Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1109. 
 120 Id. at 1111. 
 121 228 F.3d 1043, 1055 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a statute was not subject to strict scrutiny 
because it was content-neutral rather than because it was a professional regulation); see also Jacobs v. 
Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 431 (9th Cir. 2008) (observing that U.S. Supreme Court prece-
 
784 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:767 
Next, the Welch court addressed the issue of whether section 865 could 
avoid strict scrutiny because it regulated conduct.122 After describing a variety 
of techniques involved in SOCE therapy, the court concluded that there was 
not a single method that was universally accepted by mental health provid-
ers.123 Moreover, the court reasoned that SOCE performed through talk therapy 
necessarily involved speech—which the Ninth Circuit had already declared as 
being protected under the First Amendment.124 The court likened the plaintiffs 
here to the plaintiffs who intended to provide prohibited “material support” by 
means of speech in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, a 2010 case where 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that an activity consisting of talking and writing 
could not be classified as conduct.125 Additionally, the court determined that “a 
law regulating conduct that incidentally affects speech is subject to strict scru-
tiny if it is content or viewpoint-based” and, thus, it was irrelevant that SOCE 
also occurred through conduct.126 
Moreover, the court determined that section 865 was not content-neutral 
and, therefore, must be subjected to strict scrutiny.127 Licensing laws are con-
sidered content-neutral if they do not “dictate what can be said . . . during 
treatment.”128 The Welch court concluded that the fact that a mental health pro-
vider may still discuss potential benefits of SOCE with patients does not mean 
that the statute is content-neutral.129 Rather, the regulation was content-based 
because it “dr[ew] a line in the sand governing a therapy session and the mo-
ment that the mental health provider’s speech ‘seek[s] to change an individu-
                                                                                                                           
dent does not require an application of heightened scrutiny when a regulation is content-neutral and 
viewpoint-neutral). 
 122 Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1111. The speech-conduct distinction was analyzed after the stand-
ard of review was determined because the court viewed the speech that occurred during counseling as 
protected under the First Amendment based on the holding in Conant. See id. at 1109. 
 123 Id. at 1112. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Compare id. at 1113 (deliberating on the plaintiffs’ use of SOCE talk therapy), with Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27 (2010) (discussing the plaintiff’s “material support,” pro-
vided by means of speaking and writing, to foreign terrorist organizations). In Humanitarian Law 
Project, the Court held that the material support provided could not be considered pure conduct. See 
561 U.S. at 27. 
 126 See Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1113. 
 127 Id. at 1117. 
 128 Id. at 1115 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psy-
chology (NAAP), 228 F.3d 1043, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
129 Id. Defendants argued that the regulation would not “preclude a mental health provider from 
expressing his or her views to a minor patient that the minor's sexual orientation could be changed, 
informing a minor about SOCE, recommending that a minor pursue SOCE, providing a minor with 
contact information for an individual who could perform SOCE . . . .” Id. at 1114. Nevertheless, the 
court concluded that, although the regulation was not based on viewpoint, the regulation was still not 
content-neutral. Id. at 1115. 
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al’s sexual orientation’ . . . the mental health provider can no longer speak.”130 
When the conveyance of a message was prohibited based on its subject matter, 
as was the case with section 865, the court held that the regulation cannot be 
considered content-neutral.131 
2. Counseling Does Not Implicate the First Amendment and Is Subject to 
Rational Basis Review 
In Pickup I, the district court also considered free speech arguments made 
by therapists and reached a different conclusion than that of the Welch court.132 
The plaintiffs in Pickup I argued that the regulation in question violated their 
First Amendment rights because it amounted to viewpoint and content discrim-
ination.133 Specifically, they claimed that licensed mental health providers 
were prohibited from “even mentioning the viewpoint that unwanted same-sex 
attractions can be changed” and that they were forced to “espouse one view-
point regarding same-sex sexual attractions [such as stating] that they . . . can-
not be stopped.”134 Plaintiffs also alleged that section 865 regulated speech 
because psychotherapy was based on speech and therefore similar to ordinary 
                                                                                                                           
 130 Id. at 1115 (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2012 & Supp. 2015)). The court 
further acknowledged that the regulation would result in disciplinary action based only on the mental 
health provider’s speech or message. Id. Furthermore, the court determined that it was very difficult 
for SOCE treatment occurring through speech to be separated from the viewpoint of the mental health 
provider. Id. at 1116 (“When a mental health provider’s pursuit of SOCE is guided by the provider’s 
or patient’s views of homosexuality, it is difficult, if not impossible, to view the conduct of perform-
ing SOCE as anything but integrally intertwined with viewpoints, messages, and expression about 
homosexuality.”). 
 131 See id.at 1117. 
 132 Compare Pickup I, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 1358, 1360 (concluding that counseling communications 
were merely conduct which fell outside of First Amendment protection), with Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1105 (determining that counseling communications involved speech that was deserving of First 
Amendment protection). 
 133 Pickup I, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 1356. Content discrimination occurs when government regulations 
determine the topics that may be discussed. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 422 
(1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing content-based discrimination as “selective regulation of 
speech based on content”); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (establishing that 
the determination that a regulation is content-based turns on “whether the government has adopted a 
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys”). Viewpoint discrimina-
tion refers to the government suppression of a viewpoint concerning an issue because the speech of 
certain speakers has been prohibited. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 893 (1995) (providing that viewpoint discrimination occurs when a burden on speech can be 
explained by a desire to repress a certain point of view); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (providing that “the government violates the First Amendment 
when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise 
includible subject”). 
 134 Pickup I, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 1356. The plaintiffs alleged that it would not withstand strict scru-
tiny whether the statute was interpreted as restricting content or a viewpoint. Id. 
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conversation.135 The state claimed that the prohibition was not content-based 
because the regulated activity was conduct as opposed to speech.136 
The court concluded that the restrictions set out in section 865 did not 
implicate First Amendment rights and, thus, rational basis review was the ap-
propriate standard.137 The court reasoned that the statute, given its ordinary 
meaning, prohibited “actions designed to effect a difference,” not recommen-
dations or conversations.138 Based on a previous Ninth Circuit decision,139 the 
court concluded that psychoanalysis was not speech because treatment of a 
patient was its primary feature.140 Unlike the Welch court, the court viewed 
counseling as pure conduct, essentially placing it in the same category as if the 
treatment had been a physical procedure such as electroshock therapy.141 Alt-
hough psychotherapy was classified as conduct, the court recognized that it 
could be protected if it was sufficiently expressive conduct.142 Nevertheless, 
since the plaintiffs failed to show that they could demonstrate counseling 
communications amounted to expressive speech, the court did not engage in 
First Amendment analysis.143 
B. Divide Among Circuits: The Ninth Circuit Versus the Third 
Just as the district courts in California came to opposite conclusions as to 
the classification of counseling communications, so have the Ninth and Third 
Circuits.144 Subsection 1 describes the reasoning employed by the Ninth Cir-
                                                                                                                           
 135 Id. Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that the statute “dictate[d] the content of what is said in 
therapy.” Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 1358, 1360, 1376 (arguing that in addition to regulating conduct rather than speech, the 
regulation does not prevent mental health providers from mentioning SOCE to minors). 
 138 Id. at 1358. The court determined that the statute did not preclude the therapist from indicating 
that the patient might benefit from SOCE. Id. Nor did it prevent a minor from obtaining information 
about SOCE and then receiving SOCE therapy from someone other than a licensed professional. Id. 
139 NAAP, 228 F.3d at 1054 (determining that “the key component of psychoanalysis is the treat-
ment of emotional suffering and depression, not speech”). 
 140 Pickup I, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 1358–59. (relying on multiple sources that define psychotherapy to 
support this statement). 
 141 See id. at 1358. 
 142 Id. at 1359 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)); see supra notes 59–64 
and accompanying text (outlining the court’s understanding of the term “sufficiently expressive”).  
 143 Pickup I, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 1360–61. Additionally, the court determined that the plaintiffs 
were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim because the state was responsible for regulating 
the medical profession. Id. at 1361. 
144 Compare King v. Governor of N.J. (King II), 767 F.3d 216, 224 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that 
counseling communications constituted speech), and Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (finding that 
counseling communications were speech for purposes of First Amendment analysis), with Pickup II, 
728 F.3d at 1051 (determining that counseling communications were conduct), King I, 981 F. 
Supp. 2d at 317 (concluding that the counseling communications were conduct rather than speech), 
and Pickup I, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 1358 (holding that counseling communications were conduct).  
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cuit in determining that counseling communications should be classified as 
conduct.145 Subsection 2 then examines how the Third Circuit came to the con-
clusion that counseling communications must be classified as speech.146 
1. Ninth Circuit Concludes That Counseling Communications Are Conduct 
The opposing results reached by the district courts in California were 
soon combined and resolved in the Ninth Circuit.147 In 2013, in Pickup v. 
Brown (Pickup II), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
section 865 of the California Business and Professions Code regulated conduct 
and that rational basis review was the appropriate standard.148 The court’s 
analysis began with an examination of whether section 865—which prohibited 
mental health providers from engaging in SOCE therapy with minor patients—
regulated conduct or speech.149 
Similar to the analysis of the district courts, the court also interpreted and 
applied both of the prior related Ninth Circuit cases: NAAP and Conant.150 Un-
like the Welch court, however, the Ninth Circuit did not distinguish NAAP be-
cause it dealt with the constitutionality of a content-neutral regulation.151 Ra-
ther, the court relied on the conclusion in NAAP that a content-neutral regula-
tion may be upheld even if an interest in speech was impacted and that strict 
scrutiny was not triggered by a content-neutral regulation.152 With regard to 
                                                                                                                           
145 See infra notes 147–158 and accompanying notes. 
146 See infra notes 159–168 and accompanying notes. 
 147 See Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1048. 
 148 See id. at 1055, 1056. 
 149 See id. at 1051. As part of its analysis, the court viewed speech in terms of a spectrum with 
varying levels of protection. Id. at 1053–55. First Amendment protection is at its greatest when, for 
example, a professional is taking part in a public dialogue. Id. at 1053. There is reduced protection for 
speech within a professional relationship. See id. at 1054. States have the power to subject professions 
to licensing and supervision to protect the public. See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Pro-
fessional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 834 
(1999). Regulations of professional speech are generally upheld if they are rationally related to an 
individual’s “fitness or capacity” to practice the profession. Id. The nuances of a professional’s First 
Amendment right to speak with a client have been rarely considered by the U.S. Supreme Court or 
lower courts. Id. Therefore, a particular manner of analysis has not been established, although based 
on the few cases that have been decided, courts have taken a “contextual approach centered around the 
social roles of speaker and listener.” Id. at 834–35. With regard to professional speech, the court “may 
be understood as attempting to ascertain whether the conversation between the interlocutors takes 
place within defined social relationships and as seeking to afford such speech the constitutional pro-
tection necessary to preserve its particular social function.” Id. at 777. Moreover, the state has the 
power to regulate professional conduct even when that regulation has an incidental effect on speech. 
See Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1055. 
 150 See Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1051–52. 
 151 See id. at 1053; cf. NAAP, 228 F.3d at 1054 (holding that California’s medical licensing 
scheme was content-neutral).  
 152 See Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1052 (citing NAAP, 228 F.3d at 1053). 
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Conant, the court relied on the distinction made in that case between treating 
patients—which was considered conduct—and discussing treatment with pa-
tients—which was considered speech.153 The court did not recognize, as the 
Welch court had, that the Conant court’s conclusion that communication occur-
ring during psychoanalysis was entitled to protection.154 
After this preliminary analysis, the Ninth Circuit concluded that sec-
tion 865 regulated conduct.155 The court reasoned that mental health providers 
were only prevented from engaging in the treatment of minors, but were still 
free to discuss SOCE or recommend SOCE.156 Because the court concluded 
that section 865 regulated conduct and not speech, the court also held that the 
proper standard of review should be rational basis.157 After applying rational 
basis review, the Court determined that section 865 was rationally related to 
legitimate government interests.158 
2. Third Circuit Determines That Counseling Communications Are Speech 
The Pickup II approach taken by the Ninth Circuit was also echoed by a 
similar case in a district court in New Jersey.159 In 2013, in Christie v. King 
(King I), the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey considered a 
claim brought by licensed therapists alleging that the state infringed upon their 
rights under the First Amendment by prohibiting them from engaging in 
SOCE.160 Finding the reasoning of Pickup II persuasive and noting that the 
                                                                                                                           
 153 See id. at 1053; cf. Conant, 309 F.3d at 634, 639 (affirming a district court decision that rea-
soned that the treatment of patients by means of prescribing medication could be regulated, but mere 
discussions about a potential treatment could not). 
 154 Compare Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1109 (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has recognized 
that physician speech is entitled to First Amendment protection”), with Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1052–53 
(discussing the Conant case, but failing to note that the Conant court held that counseling communica-
tions were protected under the First Amendment).  
 155 See Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1055. The court reasoned that California was authorized under its 
police power to regulate therapies that the legislature found harmful. Id. Disallowing conduct in this 
case was not transformed into disallowing speech merely because speech was the method by which 
the conduct was carried out. Id. 
 156 See id. 
 157 See id. at 1056. 
 158 See id. at 1057. Protecting minors against harm caused by SOCE therapy was determined to be 
a legitimate state interest. See id. The court reasoned that it was not necessary to decide whether 
SOCE actually caused such harm because it was sufficient that a governmental decision maker could 
reasonably conceive that it is true. See id. Furthermore, the court concluded that the legislature acted 
rationally in implementing section 865. See id. 
159 See King I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 303. 
 160 See id. The New Jersey statute prohibits individuals who are licensed to practice in particular 
counseling professions from engaging in “the practice of seeking to change a [minor’s] sexual orienta-
tion.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-55 (West 2004 & Supp. 2014). Plaintiffs alleged that the statute uncon-
stitutionally restricted the content of their message to their clients by barring them from engaging in, 
or referring to another licensed professional who engages in, counseling a minor regarding “unwant-
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disputed statutes in both cases were identical, the court adopted the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s holding and concluded that regulation of the “application of psychologi-
cal principles and procedures” amounted to regulation of conduct.161 Addition-
ally, the King I court held that rational basis review was appropriate because 
counseling was not inherently expressive and that the statute in question satis-
fied the rational basis review test.162 
 The district court’s classification of counseling communications was 
rejected, however, in 2014 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
in King v. Governor of New Jersey (King II).163 Instead of adopting the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning, the Third Circuit held that counseling communication “is 
speech that enjoys some degree of protection under the First Amendment.”164 
In reaching this conclusion, the court considered whether counseling commu-
nications become conduct when they are used as the means of administering 
mental health treatment.165 In determining that such a transformation did not 
                                                                                                                           
ed” same-sex sexual attraction. See King I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 305. Plaintiffs also argued that it “au-
thorizes only one viewpoint on SOCE and unwanted same-sex sexual attractions, behaviors, and iden-
tity by forcing . . . Plaintiffs . . . to present only one viewpoint on the otherwise permissible subject 
matter of same-sex attractions.” Id.  
 161 See King I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 312, 316. In determining whether talk therapy was conduct or 
speech, the court referred to a different New Jersey statute that defines “counseling,” which indicated 
that counseling was the “the application of psychological principles and procedures.” Id. at 316; see 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14B-2. The distinction between speech and conduct in the context of counseling 
was determined to be “whether the counselor is attempting to communicate information or a particular 
viewpoint to the client or whether the counselor is attempting to apply methods, practices, and proce-
dures to bring about a change in the client—the former is speech and the latter is conduct.” King I, 
981 F. Supp. 2d at 319. The court reasoned that counseling’s “core characteristic” was not the fact that 
it occurred by means of talk therapy, but rather that therapeutic psychological methods were being 
applied to the patient. Id. at 317. 
 162 See King I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 324, 326. The court recognized that the issue of the appropriate 
standard of review turned on whether the conduct was sufficiently expressive to warrant First 
Amendment protection by being conduct that conveys a message that would be reasonably understood 
by the person receiving that message. Id. at 320. To demonstrate that counseling was “inherently ex-
pressive,” plaintiffs would have had to demonstrate that it was “intended to be communicative” and 
that clients would understand it as such, which they failed to do in their statements about their roles as 
counselors. Id. at 321, 322. The state’s interest was the protection of minors from a harmful form of 
therapy. Id. at 325. The regulation helped to serve that interest by preventing counselors from engag-
ing in SOCE therapy with minors. Id. The court noted that for the regulation to withstand review, it 
was only necessary that the legislature reasonably believed that SOCE therapy was harmful to minors 
and that the regulation would protect them. Id. The legislature based their belief on a number of find-
ings—including, for example, that SOCE posed health risks and that reputable associations had ad-
vised parents to avoid SOCE treatment for their children. Id. at 325–26. 
163 767 F.3d at 224. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. The court noted that defendants had not provided “authority from the Supreme Court or 
this circuit that have characterized verbal or written communications as ‘conduct’ based on the func-
tion these communications serve.” Id. at 225. In fact, the Third Circuit recognized that the Supreme 
Court had rejected that proposition. Id. (recognizing that in Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme 
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occur, the Third Circuit adhered to the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
proposition in Humanitarian Law Project that communications become con-
duct when used for the purpose of professional services.166 The Third Circuit 
viewed the classification of counseling communications as straightforward, 
stating “[s]imply put, speech is speech, and it must be analyzed as such for 
purposes of the First Amendment.”167 Additionally, the Third Circuit repri-
manded the district court for effectively creating a new category of speech that 
falls outside of First Amendment protection by labeling counseling communi-
cation as conduct, which is in direct contravention to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
instruction not to exercise such authority.168 
C. Against Analytical Manipulation: The Dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s 
Denial of an En Banc Rehearing 
After the Pickup II decision, in 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit in Pickup v. Brown (Pickup III) denied a petition for a rehearing 
en banc, from which Circuit Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain filed a dissenting 
opinion.169 In his dissenting opinion, Judge O’Scannlain focused on whether 
the legislature should be permitted to circumvent First Amendment judicial 
scrutiny by “defining disfavored talk as ‘conduct.’”170 The dissent argued that 
if such circumvention were allowed, the government would effectively be giv-
en a “new and powerful tool to silence expression based on a political or moral 
judgment about the content and purpose of the communications.”171 The dis-
sent recognized that classifying counseling communication as conduct means 
that the First Amendment analysis of restrictions on that communication can be 
                                                                                                                           
Court rejected the proposition that verbal communications could be classified as conduct when they 
serve a particular function). 
166 Id. at 224. The court stated that “Humanitarian Law Project makes clear that verbal or written 
communications, even those that function as vehicles for delivering professional services, are ‘speech’ 
for purposes of the First Amendment.” Id. at 225–26; see Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 27–
28. 
167 King II, 767 F.3d at 228–29. 
168 Id. at 229 (providing that the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against exercising 
“freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amend-
ment” and that, by labeling some communications as conduct, the district court had assured that they 
would not receive any constitutional protection) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 
(2010)). 
 169 See Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1214–15 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
2871 (2014), and cert. denied sub nom., Welch v. Brown, 134 S. Ct. 2881 (2014). Plaintiffs had filed 
a petition for panel rehearing and a petition for a rehearing en banc. Id. Judge O’Scannlain was joined 
by two other Circuit Judges. Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 1216. 
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completely circumvented.172 Moreover, the dissent noted that there is no doc-
trinal basis to indicate the criteria used to distinguish between “utterances” that 
are actually speech and those that are conduct.173 
Additionally, the dissent reasoned that the panel had misinterpreted U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent.174 In Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court 
recognized that a distinction could not be made between conduct and speech 
with regard to an activity that consisted of talking and writing.175 The regula-
tion at issue in Humanitarian Law Project prohibited the provision of “materi-
al support” to terrorist organizations in the form of verbal communications.176 
Although the government argued that the regulation only targeted conduct, the 
Court rejected that line of reasoning because the conduct consisted of “com-
municating a message.”177 Ultimately, the Supreme Court refused to permit a 
constitutional distinction between conduct and speech when an activity con-
sisted of speaking and writing.178 
The dissent in Pickup III also determined that the Pickup II court did not 
succeed in distinguishing Humanitarian Law Project because it misunderstood 
both the facts of that case and how the facts related to the holding.179 The dis-
                                                                                                                           
 172 See id. The dissent concluded that by “labeling such speech as ‘conduct,’ the panel’s opinion 
has entirely exempted such regulation from the First Amendment.” Id. at 1215. The dissent argued 
that there was “no principled doctrinal basis” for the classification and that the court’s decision was 
“contrary to common sense and without legal authority.” Id. at 1215–16.  
 173 Id. at 1215–16.  
 174 Id. at 1215 (providing that the Pickup II court’s decision “contravenes recent Supreme Court 
precedent”); cf. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 27 (concluding that the provision of “material 
support” through speaking and writing could not be treated as mere conduct). 
 175 561 U.S. at 27; see Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1216 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
 176 561 U.S. at 7. The term “material support” is defined in the statute at issue as “any property, 
tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, 
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, person-
nel . . . and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2012); 
see Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1216 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (noting that plaintiffs had “challenged a 
Federal statute forbidding ‘material support’ to terrorist organizations for criminalizing protected 
verbal communications”).  
 177 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 28; see Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1216 (O’Scannlain, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court did not conclude that the statute at issue in Humani-
tarian Law Project regulated only conduct because the conduct at issue communicated a message). 
 178 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 28 (establishing that an activity that consists of speak-
ing and writing is related to expression and, therefore, more demanding scrutiny must be applied); 
Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1217 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Supreme Court had 
already “flatly refused to countenance the government’s purported distinction between ‘conduct’ and 
‘speech’ for constitutional purposes when the activity at issue consisted of talking and writing”). 
 179 Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1216. The Pickup II court referred to the plaintiffs in Humanitarian 
Law Project as ordinary citizens to distinguish them from licensed mental health professionals. Id. 
Among the plaintiffs in that case, however, was a human-rights organization that had consultative 
status to the United Nations and offered “professional expertise and advice on various international 
and humanitarian issues.” Id. at 1216–17; see also Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 10 (provid-
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sent concluded that, in Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court had 
made it abundantly clear that legislatures were unable to “nullify the First 
Amendment’s protections for speech by playing this labeling game.”180 Fur-
thermore, the dissent argued that an exception to the First Amendment has 
never been recognized for state professional regulations.181 The dissent deter-
mined that the Pickup II court was mistaken in relying on NAAP and Conant as 
legal authority for the principal that there was an exception for professional 
regulations.182 For example, NAAP had stated that psychoanalysis did not re-
ceive “special First Amendment protection,” but the Pickup II court relied on 
that to support the conclusion that counseling received no protection whatso-
ever.183 In addition, the dissent noted that Conant explicitly stated that speech 
in the context of psychoanalysis was entitled to protection under the First 
Amendment.184 
III. RECOGNIZING SPEECH AS SPEECH: COUNSELING COMMUNICATIONS 
SHOULD RECEIVE PROTECTION  
Although some courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, believe that counseling 
should be considered conduct and subject to rational basis review, others, such 
as the Third Circuit, have concluded that such communications should instead 
be subject to a more robust First Amendment analysis.185 This Part argues that 
                                                                                                                           
ing that among the plaintiffs were both professionals and a human rights organization with consulta-
tive status to the United Nations). 
 180 Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1218; see Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 26 (finding that the 
defendant went “too far, claiming that the only thing truly at issue in this litigation [was] conduct, not 
speech”). 
 181 Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1218 (providing that federal courts have not recognized a First 
Amendment exception for professional regulations and have instead determined that professional 
regulations as a category do not fall outside of the protections of the First Amendment); see, e.g., Fla. 
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622–24 (1995) (determining that the First Amendment applied 
to a state regulation on attorney advertising); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 454–59 
(1978) (concluding that the First Amendment applied to a state restriction on in-person solicitation by 
attorneys); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 758–61 
(1976) (reasoning that the First Amendment applied to a professional regulation prohibiting price 
advertising by pharmacists). 
182 Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1218; see Conant, 309 F.3d at 637 (establishing that doctor communi-
cations with patients are entitled to full constitutional protection); NAAP, 228 F.3d at 1054 (conclud-
ing that, although psychoanalysis is not entitled to “special First Amendment protection,” it is entitled 
to First Amendment protection). 
 183 Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1218–19; see NAAP, 228 F.3d at 1054. 
 184 Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1219; see Conant, 309 F.3d at 637. 
 185 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26–28 (2010) (holding that an activity 
consisting of speaking and writing could not be treated as pure conduct for constitutional purposes); 
Pickup v. Brown (Pickup III), 740 F.3d 1208, 1214, 1215 (9th Cir. 2014) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the court had improperly engaged in a “labeling game” by treating counseling communi-
cation as conduct to avoid heightened scrutiny), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2871 (2014) and cert. denied 
 
2015] Classifying Counseling Communications as Speech Under the First Amendment 793 
counseling communications should be considered speech and should be subject 
to strict scrutiny because the restriction is content-based.186 Section A argues 
that counseling should not be classified as mere conduct and should instead be 
considered speech for First Amendment purposes.187 Section B shows that 
classification as speech would require courts to apply strict scrutiny to this 
type of regulation.188 Finally, Section C argues that other factors, such as recip-
ients’ ability to avoid such communications and the chilling effect a regulation 
might have on counseling, are additional reasons courts should apply strict 
scrutiny to such regulations.189 
A. Oral Communication: Clearly Containing an Expressive Element  
Application of the most recent Supreme Court reasoning on the issue of 
speech versus conduct demonstrates that counseling should not be considered 
mere conduct.190 In 2010, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that providing legal training and advising certain groups 
on advocacy could not be considered conduct and that heightened scrutiny ap-
plied.191 Likewise, counseling that takes the form of speech cannot be rechar-
acterized as conduct to avoid scrutiny under the First Amendment.192 Just like 
                                                                                                                           
sub nom., Welch v. Brown, 134 S. Ct. 2881 (2014); Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105, 
1112 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (determining that counseling communications were speech and deserving of 
First Amendment protection), rev’d sub nom., Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013); see 
also Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002) (establishing that doctor communications 
with patients are entitled to full constitutional protection); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psy-
choanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology (NAAP), 228 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that, 
although psychoanalysis is not entitled to “special First Amendment protection,” it is entitled to First 
Amendment protection). 
 186 See infra notes 190–243 and accompanying text. 
 187 See infra notes 190–207 and accompanying text. 
 188 See infra notes 208–218 and accompanying text. 
 189 See infra notes 219–243 and accompanying text. 
 190 See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 26–28; see also King v. Governor of N.J. (King 
II), 767 F.3d 216, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2014) (determining that “Humanitarian Law Project makes clear 
that verbal or written communications, even those that function as vehicles for delivering professional 
services, are ‘speech’ for purposes of the First Amendment”); Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1216 
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (observing that “the Supreme Court, in its most recent relevant case, 
flatly refused to countenance the government’s purported distinction between ‘conduct’ and ‘speech’ 
for constitutional purposes when the activity at issue consisted of talking and writing”). 
 191 See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 26–28. 
 192 See Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1218. The Court determined that despite the government’s argu-
ment that the restriction on “material support” only impacted conduct because material support most 
often does not take the form of speech and, when it does, the statute was drawn to include only a nar-
row category of speech. Id.; see also Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, 
Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1277, 1347 (2005) (arguing that “[w]hen the law restricts speech because of what the speech 
communicates—because the speech causes harms by persuading, informing, or offending—we 
shouldn’t deny that the law is a speech restriction, and requires some serious justification”). 
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the statute at issue in Humanitarian Law Project, regulations of communica-
tion that occur during counseling restrict speech based on its content.193 For 
instance, the plaintiffs in the 2013 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit in Pickup v. Brown (Pickup II) were permitted to speak freely 
during counseling sessions except for any speech that could be construed as 
sexual orientation change efforts (“SOCE”) therapy.194 Due to the similar na-
ture of the activity and regulation, the court should have followed the Supreme 
Court precedent and concluded that protected expression was restricted by the 
regulation, and therefore, heightened scrutiny applied.195 
The Pickup II panel attempted to distinguish Humanitarian Law Project 
because it viewed the plaintiffs in that case as ordinary citizens as opposed to 
professionals, when in fact the plaintiffs included a human-rights organization 
that had consultative status to the United Nations.196 The Pickup II court 
viewed the regulation at issue in Humanitarian Law Project as restricting po-
litical speech, failing to recognize that the holding was based on the “material 
support” provision.197 
In addition to Humanitarian Law Project, the 1974 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Spence v. Washington also supports the conclusion that counseling 
should be determined to be sufficiently expressive so as to be protected under 
the First Amendment.198 In Spence, the Court determined that when there was 
“[a]n intent to convey a particularized message” and the message was likely to 
be understood, the activity in question was expressive conduct.199 Similarly, 
therapists intend to convey a message to their clients through the communica-
tion that occurs while they are engaging in SOCE therapy.200 Additionally, cli-
                                                                                                                           
 193 See Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1217 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
 194 Pickup v. Brown (Pickup II), 728 F.3d 1042, 1048–50 (9th Cir. 2013), abrogated and super-
seded by Pickup III, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 195 See Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1217–18 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
 196 See id. at 1216–17 (arguing that the panel had mischaracterized the plaintiffs in Humanitarian 
Law Project). In Welch v. Brown, the district court reasoned that the plaintiffs were similar in nature 
to the plaintiffs in Humanitarian Law Project because the plaintiffs in that case intended to provide 
prohibited “material support” by means of speech. See Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1113. The Welch 
court used that determination as support for concluding that the speech involved in counseling ought 
to receive First Amendment protection as did the speech involved in providing material support. Id. 
The district court in Pickup v. Brown (Pickup I) did not consider the holding in Humanitarian Law 
Project in reaching the conclusion that section 865 regulated only conduct. Pickup v. Brown (Pickup 
I), 42 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1358 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012), aff’d, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 197 Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1217. 
 198 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). 
 199 See id. 
 200 See Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. For example, one therapist, who is Catholic, discussed the 
beliefs of that faith with patients of the same religion. Id. The court determined that it is nearly impos-
sible to view the performance of SOCE therapy as not being “integrally intertwined with viewpoints, 
messages, and expression about homosexuality.” Id. Plaintiffs claimed to be conveying a message of 
disapproval of homosexuality. See id.  
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ents are likely to understand a counselor’s message if the counselor begins us-
ing SOCE therapy techniques, especially since clients must consent to such 
techniques before they can be administered.201 
Finally, a comparison to activities that the Supreme Court has previously 
determined to be expressive conduct supports the determination that counsel-
ing should not be considered mere conduct.202 For example, the burning of an 
American flag and the placement of a peace sign on an American flag have 
both been recognized as forms of expressive conduct by the Court.203 These 
activities communicated a message less directly than a counselor’s speech, but 
were considered to contain sufficient expressive elements to implicate the First 
Amendment.204 Therefore, speech that occurs in the context of counseling 
should also be protected because counselors intend to convey a message to the 
client through their speech and it is likely to be understood by the client.205 
Conversely, activities that have been determined to be solely conduct generally 
intend a goal besides communication, such as prostitution and physical as-
sault.206 Counseling can be distinguished from those activities because the 
counselor’s speech is meant to convey a message to the client and the client is 
                                                                                                                           
 201 See id. (reasoning that SOCE therapy involves communication of a message about homosexu-
ality). See generally AM. MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELORS ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS (2000), available 
at http://www.nymhca.org/AMHCACodeofEthics.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/R2R8-WEY4 
(providing that, under professional ethical standards, clients must agree on the objectives of treatment 
and consent to treatment before counseling begins). 
 202 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (holding that physical assault was 
not expressive conduct and not protected under the First Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397, 405–06 (1989) (determining that burning an American flag as part of a political demonstration 
was sufficiently expressive to warrant First Amendment protection); Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 
U.S. 697, 705 (1986) (holding that prostitution was not expressive conduct because such sexual activi-
ty did not have the “least semblance of expressive activity”); Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11 (holding that 
displaying an American flag with a peace symbol attached to it was sufficiently expressive to be pro-
tected under the First Amendment). 
 203 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405–06 (concluding that burning an American flag was protected 
under the First Amendment because of its expressive nature); Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11 (determin-
ing that displaying an American flag with a peace sign attached warranted First Amendment protec-
tion). 
 204 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405–06 (examining whether burning an American flag was suffi-
ciently expressive); Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11 (analyzing the level of expression involved in the 
activity of flying an American flag with a peace symbol attached to it). 
 205 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405–06 (determining that the speaker intended to convey a message 
by burning the American flag that was likely to be understood by others); Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11 
(holding that the plaintiff intended to communicate a message by flying the American flag with a 
peace symbol attached and others would understand that message). 
 206 See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484 (holding that physical assault was not protected under the First 
Amendment); Arcara, 478 U.S. at 705 (concluding that prostitution was not sufficiently expressive to 
warrant First Amendment protection). 
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able to reasonably understand that message, whereas it would be difficult to 
understand the message being conveyed by a physical assault or prostitution.207 
B. Different Analysis, Same Outcome: State Regulations Restricting SOCE 
Are Likely to be Upheld Under Heightened Scrutiny 
Assuming that counseling was determined to contain sufficient elements 
of speech to implicate the First Amendment, restrictions on speech during 
counseling would be subject to a heightened standard of review.208 Strict scru-
tiny should apply to the regulation at issue because it restricts the speech of 
counselors on the basis of the message being conveyed, and is therefore con-
tent-based.209 The strict scrutiny standard requires that a statute be held uncon-
stitutional unless it is “necessary” and “narrowly tailored” to “serve a compel-
ling government interest.”210 
When subjected to a strict scrutiny, statutes that regulate the administra-
tion of SOCE therapy to minors would likely be upheld as constitutional.211 
Nevertheless, it is important that the government not be allowed to bypass First 
Amendment protection by manipulating the classification of an activity be-
cause that could result in the inability to properly review an unconstitutional 
regulation.212 In Pickup II, the legislature relied on multiple reports from high-
                                                                                                                           
 207 See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484 (reasoning that physical assault was not expressive in nature); 
Arcara, 478 U.S. at 705 (reasoning that prostitution was an activity that lacked an expressive ele-
ment). 
 208 See Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1221 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (“Subjecting regulations of pro-
fessionals’ speech to some degree of scrutiny under the First Amendment indeed does not necessarily 
call their legitimacy into question.”); see also Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 
657, 659 (1990) (applying strict scrutiny and upholding a regulation prohibiting corporations from 
supporting candidates using general treasury funds); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24–28 (1976) 
(applying the “closest scrutiny” standard and upholding a regulation on speech in the form of cam-
paign contribution limits due to the government’s compelling interest in the integrity of electoral pro-
cess). 
 209 See Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. When a regulation is unrelated to expression, the inter-
mediate scrutiny test regulating “noncommunicative conduct” applies. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403. 
Conversely, if the regulation is related to expression, then a more demanding standard must be ap-
plied. Id.; see also Haggerty, supra note 16, at 1125–26. 
 210 Fallon, supra note 85, at 1273. 
 211 See Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1221 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting); see also Sherman & McNama-
ra, supra note 102 (arguing that strict scrutiny is not “insurmountable” and that it is “possible, maybe 
even likely” that the California regulation of SOCE counseling could withstand strict scrutiny). 
 212 See Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1216, 1218 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting); see also Sherman & 
McNamara, supra note 102 (arguing that permitting regulation of an activity to avoid First Amend-
ment analysis because the activity is labeled conduct undermines First Amendment protections entire-
ly). Essentially, the government could engage in a “labeling game” by drafting a regulation that ap-
pears to regulate conduct with the result that speech involved in that conduct is prohibited without the 
regulation receiving any meaningful review. See Pickup III, 740 F.3d at 1218 (O’Scannlain, J., dis-
senting).  
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ly reputable organizations that had concluded that SOCE therapy was danger-
ous and harmful to minors.213 Additionally, SOCE has been found to expose 
gay, lesbian, and bisexual people to critical health risks.214 SOCE has also been 
known to cause recipients to develop feelings of guilt and anxiety and has little 
potential to alter an individual’s sexual orientation.215 Thus, the regulation 
would likely satisfy the state interest requirement because protection of minors 
has previously been recognized as a compelling state interest.216 
Furthermore, as the court in Pickup II recognized, mental health providers 
are not prevented from speaking publicly about SOCE, expressing their views 
about SOCE to patients, or applying SOCE techniques to a patient older than 
eighteen.217 The regulation proscribes only the speech involved in administer-
ing SOCE therapy to minors and, therefore, is “necessary” and “narrowly tai-
lored” to prevent minors from being harmed.218 
C. Determining an Appropriate Level of Scrutiny: “Ability to Avoid” and 
the Potential Chilling Effect as Factors 
Free speech occupies a “preferred position” in the body of First Amend-
ment law.219 Along with the freedom of the press and freedom of religion, 
                                                                                                                           
 213 See Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1050. The court relied particularly on a report from the American 
Psychological Association. JUDITH M. GLASSGOLD ET AL., REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTA-
TION, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N 42 (2009), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/therapeutic-
response.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/P2LY-34ES (providing that studies indicate that “attempts to 
change sexual orientation may cause or exacerbate distress and poor mental health in some individu-
als, including depression and suicidal thoughts”).  
 214 See King v. Christie (King I), 981 F. Supp. 2d 296, 325–26 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d, 767 F.3d 216 
(3d Cir. 2014); GLASSGOLD ET AL., supra note 213, at 42 (concluding that sexual orientation change 
efforts can cause mental distress and harm to some patients). 
 215 GLASSGOLD ET AL., supra note 213, at 42. 
 216 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 263 (2002) (noting that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has “long recognized” that the government has a compelling interest in protecting children); 
Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125 (1989) (holding that protection of minors is 
a compelling state interest in the context of strict scrutiny review); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 
756 (1982) (providing that it is “beyond the need for elaboration” that a state has a compelling interest 
in the protection of minors). 
 217 See Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1049–50. 
 218 See id.; see also CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1 (West 2012 & Supp. 2015) (providing that 
mental health providers are prohibited from administering SOCE therapy to minors); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 45:1-55 (West 2004 & Supp. 2014) (providing that mental health providers cannot engage in SOCE 
therapy with minors); Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. at 657, 659 (applying strict scrutiny and 
upholding a regulation prohibiting corporations from supporting candidates using general treasury 
funds); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24–28 (1976) (applying “closest scrutiny” and upholding a regulation on 
speech in the form of campaign contribution limits due to the government’s compelling interest in 
maintaining the integrity of the electoral process).  
 219 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949) (describing freedom of speech as occupying a 
“preferred position” in our society); see also Henderson, supra note 21, at 542. 
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freedom of speech is so vital that it requires more active judicial protection.220 
Conversely, the prohibition or restriction of free speech has a direct and nega-
tive effect on the democratic process.221 Subsection 1 reasons that an applica-
tion of strict scrutiny is supported by the fact that SOCE therapy can be avoid-
ed without substantial difficulty.222 Subsection 2 then argues that counseling 
should not be classified as conduct because it would have a chilling effect on 
counseling communications.223 
1. Ability to Avoid a Message 
The U.S. Supreme Court has noted the ability of individuals to “effective-
ly avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their 
eyes” when determining whether expression by a speaker should be constitu-
tionally prohibited.224 When individuals are able to avoid an offensive message 
by simply looking in another direction, it seems less necessary to prevent the 
communication of the message in the first place.225 Nevertheless, where it is 
more difficult for an individual to avoid “further bombardment,” prohibiting 
the conveyance of the message in the first place might be more important.226 
Counseling can be distinguished from other activities that have been con-
sidered expressive conduct because the message the counselor is conveying 
                                                                                                                           
 220 See Henderson, supra note 21, at 542. The rationale for such vigorous protection of freedom 
of speech is the important role that it plays in our democratic form of government. See id. See general-
ly Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. Rev. 1156 (1986) (dis-
cussing the historical background of the First Amendment and exploring the development of the First 
Amendment doctrine over time).  
 221 See Henderson, supra note 21, at 542. Under the political process theory, “core function” of 
free speech is “the protection of the democratic political process from the abusive censorship of politi-
cal debate by the transient majority who has democratically achieved political power.” See David A.J. 
Richards, Public and Private in the Discourse of the First Amendment, 12 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT-
ERATURE 61, 64 (2000). Restrictions on speech imposed by a majority would inhibit political debate, 
which would have an adverse effect on the democratic process. See id. 
222 See infra notes 224–238 and accompanying text. 
223 See infra notes 239–243 and accompanying text. 
 224 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (noting that individuals who observed the 
plaintiff’s jacket—that had profanity written on it—could choose not to look at the jacket if they were 
offended by it). 
 225 See id. (considering an observer’s ability to look away from a jacket with profanity written on 
it as a factor in determining that the state could not punish the expression because it was protected 
under the First Amendment). 
 226 See id. A captive audience is one that is unable to escape a message that they do not wish to 
receive. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (concluding that passengers 
in a streetcar were a captive audience and distinguishing streetcar signs from the radio because they 
cannot be turned off). If an audience is not captive, individuals would likely be able to avoid a mes-
sage that they do not wish to receive. See id.  
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typically only reaches the client in his or her office.227 Other activities consid-
ered by the courts took place in public where others could observe the act.228 
For example, one plaintiff wore a jacket with profanity written on the back of 
it in public and another displayed an American flag with a peace symbol at-
tached to it.229 Anyone who was also in the same public space at the same time 
would have had the ability to avoid the activities of those plaintiffs and the 
message being conveyed by those activities.230 On the other hand, counseling 
typically takes place in the therapist’s office, so there is no concern that the 
offensive message will reach a broad audience.231 Additionally, in most cases, 
a therapist’s patients meet with them out of their own free will and are not 
forced or coerced into undergoing counseling.232 
In addition to considering whether a regulation is content-based or con-
tent-neutral when determining the appropriate level of scrutiny, courts should 
consider whether the message restricted by a regulation can be avoided without 
significant hardship.233 If a message is avoidable without hardship, strict scru-
tiny should be applied so that there is a greater likelihood that the regulation 
will not be upheld because the loss of the speaker’s free expression is greater 
than the harm caused by conveyance of a message that can be avoided.234 
                                                                                                                           
 227 See Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1049–50. But see Psychotherapy: Understanding Group Therapy, 
AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/group-therapy.aspx, archived at http://perma.
cc/LX44-NQWM (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (explaining that counseling can also occur in group 
settings, in which case the message may reach a larger audience). 
 228 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 406; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16. 
 229 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 406; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16. 
 230 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 406; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16. Although it may seem simple enough to 
avoid messages you don’t want to see, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that we are captive 
audiences for many purposes. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975). Alt-
hough the Court has recognized that much of what we encounter “offends our esthetic, if not our polit-
ical and moral, sensibilities,” the Court has concluded that the “Constitution does not permit govern-
ment to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protec-
tion for the unwilling listener or viewer.” Id. Rather, the burden is on the observer to avoid the mes-
sage by “averting (his) eyes.” Id. at 210–11 (citation omitted). 
 231 See Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1049–50. 
 232 See id. Similarly, an individual reading the newspaper or browsing the internet has the free-
dom to decide not to read any article or advice column they come upon. See Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 
F.3d 226, 230 (4th Cir. 2013). This may be less true for a minor, who, for instance, may be coerced 
into meeting with the counselor by a family member. See Pickup II, 728 F.3d at 1049–50. But see AM. 
MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELORS ASS’N, supra note 201, at 1, 2 (providing that patients must be given 
the freedom to choose whether to enter into counseling or which professional will provide counsel-
ing). 
 233 See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (noting that recipients of the plaintiff’s message could effectively 
avoid that message simply by looking away). 
 234 See id. 
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Entering into a counseling relationship with a counselor who practices 
particular techniques can be avoided without significant hardship.235 Before 
engaging in counseling, counselors must fully inform clients of the purpose 
and nature of treatment pursuant to the American Mental Health Counselors 
Association’s Code of Ethics.236 In the case of SOCE therapy, if a patient does 
not wish to receive that kind of treatment, the patient could simply decline to 
receive counseling from that professional entirely, or, if the patient is unable to 
decline, the patient could decline that form of treatment at the outset when the 
treatment plan was determined.237 These options are available to the patient 
because, according to the Code of Ethics, a counselor cannot begin performing 
SOCE therapy during a counseling session without the client’s prior approv-
al.238 
2. Potential Chilling Effect 
It cannot be ignored that the regulation of communication in the context 
of counseling would have a chilling effect on the free speech of those who 
provide counseling services.239 This occurs when “individuals seeking to en-
gage in activity protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment are deterred from doing 
so by governmental regulation not specifically directed at that protected activi-
ty.”240 Regulations that chill free expression are of constitutional concern be-
cause free expression is a preferred value, which means that it is given extra 
weight compared with other values.241 The deterrence of a protected activity 
                                                                                                                           
 235 See generally AM. MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELORS ASS’N, supra note 201 (outlining numerous 
client options, rights, and freedoms, and ultimately giving clients control of the process).  
 236 See id. at 1. 
 237 See generally id. (highlighting the high level of autonomy the patient has in making therapy 
decisions). Similarly, individuals who come across advice online, especially advice by an author who 
indicates that he has no training or certification in the subject matter area, are free to move on from the 
website or take the advice with a grain of salt. See Cooksey, 721 F.3d at 230. 
 238 See AM. MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELORS ASS’N, supra note 201, at 3. 
 239 See Sherman & McNamara, supra note 102 (arguing that permitting First Amendment analy-
sis to be circumvented by labeling expression as conduct would silence speakers attempting to engage 
in protected speech). 
 240 See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Ef-
fect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978). Scholars have argued that the right to free speech is an “af-
firmative value” and that the First Amendment is “based on the assumption, perhaps unprovable, that 
the uninhibited exchange of information [and] the active search for truth . . . are positive virtues.” See 
id. at 691, 693. Additionally, protected expression is a “particularly valuable activity toward which 
legal rules must show special solicitude.” See Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1650 (2013) (discussing why the chilling effect matters). 
 241 See Kendrick, supra note 240, at 1650 (“The chilling effect is of constitutional moment be-
cause protected expression is a particularly valuable activity toward which legal rules must show 
special solicitude.”); see also Schauer, supra note 240, at 705 (arguing that chilling effect is of con-
cern to courts only because freedom of speech is a “preferred value”). 
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should not be allowed without the restriction being subjected to a higher level 
of scrutiny than deferential rational basis.242 Classifying counseling communi-
cations as conduct and, thus, permitting such communications to be regulated 
with greater ease, would result in a less diverse marketplace of treatment op-
tions.243 
CONCLUSION 
The importance of protecting free expression suggests that regulations of 
expression, especially content-based regulations, should be subject to a higher 
standard of review rather than the deferential rational basis review. It is con-
sistent with the notion that freedom of speech should be carefully guarded. As 
such, the state should bear the burden of demonstrating that a regulation bur-
dening counseling communications is necessary to further a compelling state 
interest before that regulation can be upheld. An additional factor, which might 
be helpful in discerning whether a regulation should be upheld or whether it is 
an overly prohibitive restriction, is the ability of individuals who might receive 
the message to avoid it. Allowing activities as closely tied to speech as coun-
seling communications to be regulated without a challenging standard of re-
view makes it too simple for other activities to be similarly characterized as 
conduct and prohibited without substantial judicial review. If it looks like 
speech, acts like speech, and sounds like speech, it should be considered 
speech, not conduct. 
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 242 See Kendrick, supra note 240, at 1650. 
 243 See Paul Sherman & Jeff Rowes, Op-Ed., Psychological Warfare (Licensed) in Kentucky, 
WALL ST. J., Jul. 17, 2013, at A17 (arguing that counseling communications should be recognized as 
speech that is protected under the First Amendment). 
   
 
